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“INDIANS, IN A JURISDICTIONAL SENSE”: TRIBAL CITIZENSHIP AND 






In 1844, an exasperated Agency Superintendent reported to the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs details of a troubling case. William Armstrong described the hanging of 
Jacob West, a white man of no Indian ancestry, at the order of a Cherokee court for 
participating in the murder of a Cherokee.1 West had been married to a Cherokee and 
had lived in the Cherokee Nation.2 Under Cherokee law in effect at the time, he qualified 
to be a naturalized citizen of the Nation.3 West unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas 
corpus from the federal district court in Arkansas to release him from Cherokee 
custody.4 According to Armstrong, the court denied West’s request because West had 
married into the Cherokee Nation and “had, for all legal purposes, become one of the 
tribe.”5 Based on West’s execution at the order of the tribal court, Armstrong asked, 
 
are all other tribes to exercise the same jurisdiction? Are the Osage to be 
suffered to scalp any white man married among them, whenever, 
according to their peculiar customs, he may have incurred that penalty? . . 
. If an American, by marriage and residence among the Cherokees 
becomes for all legal purposes an Indian, it is difficult to conceive why the 
same consequences should not result from marrying and residing among 
any other tribe.6  
 
 Fast forward to 2011. The Court of Appeals of the Port Gamble S’Klallam Tribe 
faced a similar question, though under somewhat different facts: could a non-Indian be 
subject to the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction by simply signing a form indicating his 
consent?7 In Port Gamble S’Klallam v. Hjert, the non-Indian defendant consented to                                                         
∗ Assistant Attorney General, Navajo Nation Department of Justice, Window Rock, Arizona. Thanks to the 
editors of the American Indian Law Journal for their work on the article. Thanks to the following for 
reading drafts of the article and providing helpful suggestions: Bidtah Becker, Herb Becker, Bethany 
Berger, Kirsty Gover, and David Wilkins. Thanks always to the Becker family, the Spruhan family, and 
Bahe and Tazbah for inspiring my work.  
1 Sen. Doc. No. 1, 28th Congress, 2nd Session 461 (1844-45). Armstrong’s correspondence is also 
discussed in Bethany Berger, “Power over this Unfortunate Race”: Race, Politics and Indian Law in 
United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 1998-99 (2004). 
2 Sen. Doc. No. 1, supra, note 1, at 461.  
3 See An Act to Legalize Intermarriage with White Men, September 28, 1839, reprinted in The 
Constitution and Laws of the Cherokee Nation 1839-51, at 32-33 (N.D.).  
4 Sen. Doc. No. 1, supra, note 1, at 461. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 461-62. 
7 See Port Gamble S’Klallam v. Hjert, No. POR-CR-09/09-169 (slip op. December 15, 2011).  
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prosecution by the tribal court for alcohol offenses by signing such a form.8 Hjert had 
previously pled guilty before the tribal court to similar offenses and been sentenced to 
detention, fines, and probation.9 The form, apparently prepared by the tribal prosecutor, 
explicitly limited the scope of consent to prosecution in that case, and not a general 
consent to tribal authority10 Despite his consent, and his apparent failure to seek 
dismissal of the prosecution, the tribal trial court dismissed the case on its own, ruling 
that the tribe had no jurisdiction.11 The tribal Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, 
holding that though non-Indians generally might be able to consent to tribal jurisdiction, 
the absence of an affirmative tribal statute authorizing such consent meant that the tribe 
currently lacked such jurisdiction.12 Further, the court ruled that the consent itself did not 
comport with the due process requirements of the Indian Civil Rights Act in the absence 
of evidence that it was “freely and expressly given, voluntary, intelligent and case 
specific.”13  
 
 These different outcomes reflect not only differences in the two tribal nations’ 
laws at the time of the cases but also significant changes in the federal view of and 
influence on tribal criminal jurisdiction. Between 1844 and 2011 federal courts would 
claim to reduce tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to the point that standard 
descriptions of federal Indian law state that tribes lack any such jurisdiction, or, at least 
that such authority is restricted solely to contempt and exclusion from tribal lands.14 
Indeed, a mere two years after Armstrong’s report on West’s execution, the United 
States Supreme Court decided United States v. Rogers, ruling that the United States 
had jurisdiction to prosecute a white man married into the Cherokee Nation.15 In 
Rogers, the Supreme Court concluded that a white man could not claim to be an 
“Indian” exempt from federal jurisdiction based on his status as a citizen of the Nation.16 
According to the Court, Indian status was racial under federal criminal law, barring white 
men from being “Indians.”17 Though, as discussed below, the ruling did not forbid tribal 
jurisdiction over the same offense or the naturalization of non-Indians as tribal citizens, 
it nonetheless interfered with tribes’ citizenship determinations by stripping exclusive 
tribal jurisdiction. More significantly, the United States Supreme Court some one 
hundred and thirty five years after Rogers ruled in Oliphant v. Suquamish that tribes 
lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians at all.18 Though this ruling did not explicitly                                                         
8 Hjert., slip op. at 1-2. 
9 Id. at 1. 
10 Id. at 2. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 15. 
13 Id. at 16. 
14 See, e.g., FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 9.04 (2005 Nell Newton, ed.); STEPHEN 
PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 140-41 (4th ed. 2012).  
15 United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1846). For a detailed discussion of the background of 
the case, see Berger, supra, note 1; DAVID WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT 38-49 (1997).  
16 See Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572-73.  
17 Id. at 573. 
18 Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).  
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prohibit consent, the sweeping nature of the ruling created more doubt on its viability.19 
The Cherokee Nation’s decision to execute West was not made with any consideration 
of federal views expressed in Oliphant, while such views greatly affected the S’Klallam’s 
decision to dismiss Hjert’s prosecution, as the Court of Appeals discussed in detail in its 
opinion.20  
 
 In the face of these developments that purport to restrict if not outright bar 
consent, the question still remains: Can tribes exert criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians who consent, by whatever means, to adhere to tribal laws? Has federal Indian 
law, and tribes’ reaction to it, changed the universe of tribal jurisdiction so significantly 
that non-Indians can truly never be subject to tribal criminal law? This article explores 
the concept of consent as a still viable theory of tribal criminal jurisdiction. I first examine 
some historical examples of non-Indian consent through adoption or naturalization 
under tribal law, and reactions to such consent by federal officials. I then discuss 
modern examples of tribal law theories of consent, primarily through recent statutory law 
and opinions of the Navajo Nation. Finally, I suggest different forms of consent tribes 
might consider, and their relative potential success in surviving federal scrutiny. 
Ultimately, I conclude that the grant of tribal citizenship to non-Indians has the greatest 
likelihood of establishing consent. However, I also conclude that non-Indians should 
consent to tribal criminal jurisdiction to foster true tribal sovereignty. 
 
 At the outset, it is important to define clearly what I mean by “consent.” I am not 
defining it to mean mere physical presence on tribal lands, as the United States 
Supreme Court in Oliphant and Duro v. Reina, discussed below, has clearly rejected 
that theory of consent.21 What I mean by “consent” is a voluntary acceptance, whether 
explicit or implicit, by a non-Indian of tribal criminal jurisdiction. This voluntary 
acceptance may be through the grant of citizenship by a tribe; marriage or other familial 
affiliation with a tribal member; or written acknowledgment of tribal authority generally or 
in a specific case, whether as a stated condition of living or working on tribal lands or 
not. In reality, on the ground in Indian Country, non-Indians quietly but routinely consent 
through compliance with tribal police on roads or in their homes on the reservation, 
through waivers of their federally-recognized right to file a writ of habeas corpus, or 
other jurisdictional challenge to tribal authority.22 These consents are done with little                                                         
19 See Hjert, slip. op. at 9-10 (discussing whether Oliphant means that tribes lack subject matter or 
personal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and therefore whether non-Indians can ever consent); Christoper 
Chaney, The Effect of the United States Supreme Court’s Decisions During the Last Quarter of the 
Nineteenth Century on Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 14 BYU J. PUB. L., 186 (2000) (discussing concern that 
Oliphant precludes jurisdiction based on general rule that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be created by 
consent).  
20 See Hjert, slip op. at 4-13 (discussing federal limitations on tribal jurisdiction).  
21 Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. at 212 (stating flatly that “Indian tribes do not have inherent authority 
to try and punish non-Indians.”); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696 (1990) (rejecting argument that 
defendant’s contacts with tribe justified tribal jurisdiction as merely a different articulation of argument that 
physical presence is enough to establish criminal jurisdiction). For further discussion of the federal theory 
of consent in Duro, see infra, notes 123-26.  
22 Indeed, on some Indian reservations, tribal police are the only, or, at least, closest first responders to 
incidents involving non-Indians when 911 or other requests for assistance are made to law enforcement.  
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fanfare, and evade documentation through tribal or federal court decisions.23 What I am 
interested in here, however, are attempts under affirmative tribal law to establish 
consent as a means of tribal authority. How have tribes conceptualized consent, and 
how might they in the future, whether with federal review in mind or not? To answer this 
question, it is important to first consider how tribes have historically dealt with 
jurisdiction over non-Indians through consent.  
 
HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF TRIBAL LAWS OF CONSENT THROUGH ADOPTION OR 
NATURALIZATION 
 
 One simple way non-Indians historically consented to tribal authority was through 
adoption or naturalization as citizens of the tribal nation. Accounts of tribal societies 
include numerous references to non-Indians living among Indians, whether by marrying 
into the tribe or simply settling among them.24 Accounts of so-called “white Indians” 
described persons taken captive by tribes during times of conflict, who elected to remain 
with the tribe even after attempts to ransom or return them to white society.25 Some 
tribes engaged in elaborate adoption ceremonies for non-Indians and through such 
ceremonies some captives replaced family members killed in wars.26 Some of these 
non-Indians who married into tribal society lived their whole lives in it, and produced 
“mixed-blood” children.27 Other tribes, even into the late nineteenth century, adopted 
whites married into the tribe or otherwise residing among them, through approval by 
                                                        
23 The U.S. Supreme Court in Duro v. Reina believed this acquiescence to tribal jurisdiction may be why 
there were, in its view, few federal challenges to tribal court jurisdiction. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. at 
689.  
24 See, e.g., Letter of Lewis Cass and Duncan McArthur to Acting Secretary of War George Graham, 
September 30, 1817, reprinted in 2 American State Papers, Indian Affairs 138, 139 (1834) (discussing 
non-Indians living among Wyandot who “have identified themselves in feelings, manners, and interest 
with the Indians.”); Letter of Thomas McKenney to Secretary of War James Barbour, September 2, 1825 
reprinted in 2 American State Papers, at 651 (listing one hundred and forty seven white men and seventy 
three white women married into Cherokee Nation); Jedidiah Morse, Report to the Secretary of War on 
Indian Affairs, Appendix 37 (1822) (discussing white and black men married into Fond Du Lac tribe); 
James Axtell, The White Indians of Colonial America, 32 WILLIAM AND MARY QUARTERLY 55, 56 (1975) 
(reporting that “large numbers of Englishmen had chosen to become Indians- by running away from 
colonial society and joining Indian society, by not trying to escape after being captured, or by electing to 
remain with their Indian captors when treaties of peace periodically afforded them the opportunity to 
return home.”).  
25 Letter of Lewis Cass, supra, note 24, at 139 (“Some have been taken prisoners in early life [and] have 
married Indian women[.]”); Axtell, supra, note 22, at 56-58; see generally, JOHN DEMOS, THE UNREDEEMED 
CAPITIVE (1994) (recounting story of Eunice Williams, daughter of a New England preacher taken captive 
by Kahnawake Mohawks who refused to return to English society).  
26 See Axtell, supra, note 24 at 59, 67, 69-73; Demos, supra, note 25, at 81-82, 137, 163 (describing 
adoption of captives and assignment of captives to Mohawk clans).  
27 See, e.g., Demos, supra, note 25, at 142, 186 (discussing white men and women captured at a young 
age who married and had children with Iroquois Indians); see generally S.C. GWYNNE, EMPIRE OF THE 
SUMMER MOON (2011) (discussing Cynthia Parker, a white woman captured by the Comanche at age nine 
who refused to leave the Comanche until forcibly returned, and her mixed-blood son, Quanah Parker, 
who waged war against white settlers).  
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tribal councils.28 Some tribes allowed them to vote or participate in negotiations on 
important tribal matters, including agreements to cede tribal lands.29  
 
Three of the five so-called “Civilized Tribes” had formal citizenship laws that 
authorized whites married to tribal citizens to become citizens of the Nation. Similar in 
content, each tribe’s law recognized the ability of whites to be naturalized or adopted. 
An early Cherokee statute passed in 1819, before removal of the Nation to the Indian 
Territory, required white men to get a license from the national clerk and to marry a 
Cherokee woman through a minister or “other authorized person” before they could be 
recognized as citizens of the Nation.30 In 1836, the Choctaw Nation similarly recognized 
the right of naturalization for a white man married to a Choctaw woman, and, like the 
Cherokee Nation, stated that if the white man parted from his wife “without just 
provocation,” he would forfeit his citizenship.31 Both later required such white men to 
swear allegiance to the tribe and to abide by its laws.32 Later statutes passed by both 
tribal nations, as well as the Chickasaw Nation, required certification by a certain 
number of citizens vouching for the white man’s character before naturalization could 
occur.33 In its 1855 constitution, the Chickasaw Nation recognized the authority of the 
legislature to adopt anyone except “a negro, or descendant of a negro,” though such 
adoption only granted the right “to settle and remain in the nation, and to be subject to 
its laws.”34 It further made intermarried men and women eligible for annuities as 
citizens, though they were barred from “any office of trust or profit in [the] Nation.”35  
 
The Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw and Seminole Nations recognized the right of 
blacks to citizenship under certain circumstances. Though intermarriage with blacks had 
been prohibited under Cherokee law in 1839,36 the Cherokee Nation in 1866 amended                                                         
28 See, e.g., Letter of Commissioner D.W. Browning to the Secretary of the Interior, June 7, 1895, 
reprinted in Transcript of Record, United States ex. rel. West v. Hitchcock, No. 194, 27, 31 (discussing 
Wichita tribal council decision to approve adoption of white men and white women as citizens); Letter of 
D.W. Browning to Jane Shirley, April 3, 1894, reprinted in Transcript of Record, supra, at 44-45 
(discussing adoption of white man by Comanche, Wichita, and Caddo tribes); Letter of Acting Secretary 
M.L. Joslyn to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 13, 1884, reprinted in Transcript of Record, 
supra, at 39-40 (discussing adoption of whites by Quapaw tribe).  
29 See, e.g., 2 American State Papers, supra, note 24, at 239 (1820 report of treaty commissioners of 
appointment of principal chiefs and “six white men and half-breeds” to Choctaw negotiation committee); 
Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 14, 52nd Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1892) (listing at least one white man as “male adult 
member” of Wichita tribe empowered to vote on agreement).  
30 Act of November 2, 1819, reprinted in 2 American States Papers, supra, note 24, at 283.  
31 Act of October 8, 1836, reprinted in The Constitution and Laws of the Choctaw Nation (1840).  
32 Act of November 10, 1843, Constitution and Laws of the Cherokee Nation 1839-1841, 92 (N.D.); Act of 
October 30, 1888, Constitution and Laws of the Choctaw Nation (1894). 
33 Act of October 19, 1876, §1, reprinted in Laws of the Chickasaw Nation, I.T. relating to Intermarried and 
Adopted Citizens and the Rights of Freedmen 26 (N.D.). 
34 General Provisions, § 11, Constitution of 1856, reprinted in Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the 
Chickasaws (1860) (emphasis added). 
35 Constitution of the Chickasaw Nation, 1855, General Provisions, Section 9, reprinted in Constitution, 
Laws and Treaties of the Chickasaws, supra, note 34. 
36 Act of September 19, 1839, reprinted in Constitution and Laws of the Cherokee Nation, supra, note 32, 
at 19.  
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its constitution to recognize the right of former slaves and free blacks living within the 
Nation at the beginning of the Civil War, and their descendants, to citizenship in the 
Nation.37 Such amendment appears to be based on the Cherokee’s agreement in its 
1866 treaty with the United States to recognize such “Freedmen” as entitled to “all the 
rights of native Cherokees.”38 The Seminoles similarly agreed in their 1866 treaty that 
certain “persons of African descent and blood,” and their descendants, as well as “such 
other of the same race” were allowed to live in the Nation and “enjoy all the rights of 
native citizens.”39 The Creeks similarly agreed to recognize blacks under an almost 
identical provision in their treaty.40 The treaty with the Choctaw and Chickasaws placed 
$300,000 paid by the United States for land cessions in trust until the tribes passed laws 
to accept the Freedmen and their descendants as citizens.41 The Choctaws accepted 
them through legislation passed in 1883.42 
 
 Importantly, those Nations reserved criminal authority over such naturalized 
citizens in their treaties with the United States. In the 1835 Treaty of New Echota, the 
Cherokees reserved to themselves the power to pass laws for the protection of “persons 
and property within their own country belonging to their people or such persons as have 
connected themselves with them.”43 In the Cherokee Nation’s 1866 treaty, the Nation 
reserved “exclusive jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases arising within their country 
in which members of the nation, by nativity or adoption, shall be the only parties, or 
where the cause of action shall arise in the Cherokee Nation[.]“44 As Freedmen were 
granted citizenship in the same treaty, such jurisdiction appears to have extended to 
them as well as intermarried whites.45 The Nation reiterated this authority in an 1891 
agreement with the United States.46 In their collective 1866 treaty, the Choctaws and 
Chickasaws similarly reserved such right over intermarried white persons residing on 
tribal lands or who had been adopted by legislative action, stating that such a white 
person was 
                                                         
37 Constitution of the Cherokee Nation, amended Article III, Section 5, November 26, 1866, reprinted in 
Constitution and Laws of the Cherokee Nation (1875).  
38 Treaty with the Cherokee Nation, July 19, 1866, Art. 9. In a recent opinion, the Cherokee Supreme 
Court concluded that the treaty provision did not grant citizenship, but only promised that the Freedmen 
“would be treated as equals to the citizens of the Cherokee Nation under the federal law as it existed at 
the time.” Cherokee Registrar v. Nash, No. SC-2011-02, slip op. at 8 (August 22, 2011).  
39 Treaty with the Seminoles, March 21,1866, Art. 2.  
40 Treaty with the Creeks, June 14, 1866, Art. 2.  
41 Treaty with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, April 28, 1866, Art. 3.  
42 See Lucas v. United States, 163 U.S. 612, 614 (1896) (discussing legislation).  
43 Treaty with the Cherokees, December 29, 1835, Art. 5 (emphasis added). 
44 Treaty with the Cherokee Nation, supra, note 38, Art. 13.  
45 The United States Supreme Court concluded as much in Alberty v. United States, which concerned the 
prosecution of a Cherokee Freedmen for the murder of an illegitimate child of a black female slave and a 
Choctaw man. See 162 U.S. 499, 500-01 (1896). The wife of the victim was a black “freed woman” made 
a citizen of the Cherokee Nation by the Treaty of 1866. Id. at 501. Though the Court believed Alberty, the 
defendant, was a citizen of the Cherokee Nation and under its jurisdiction if the victim were also a citizen, 
it concluded Cherokee law precluded the victim from being a citizen, as marriage to a freedman did not 
confer citizenship on the spouse. See Id. at 499, 501. 
46 Agreement with the Cherokee Nation, December 19, 1891, Art. 2.  
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deemed to be a member of said nation, and . . . subject to the laws of the 
Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations according to his domicile, and to 
prosecution and trial before their tribunals, and to punishment according to 
their laws in all respects as though he was a native Choctaw or 
Chickasaw.47  
 
The Seminoles similarly stated in their treaty that “the laws of said nation shall be 
equally binding upon all persons of whatever race or color, who may be adopted as 
citizens or members of said tribe.”48 The Creeks included an almost identical provision 
in their treaty, with the addition that all citizens were also entitled to equal protection 
under their law.49 Through these treaty provisions, tribal nations asserted their right to 
exert jurisdiction over non-Indians who became tribal citizens.  
 
HISTORICAL FEDERAL RECOGNITION OF NON-INDIAN TRIBAL CITIZENS 
 
How did federal courts and federal officials react to such assertions of the right to 
confer citizenship and prosecute based upon such citizenship? Read in isolation, the 
holding of U.S. v. Rogers, that a white man married into a tribe could not be an “Indian” 
under federal criminal law, might be seen as the beginning of the complete racialization 
of Indian status, or at least the federal repudiation of non-Indian tribal citizenship. 
However, the Court made that ruling only in the context of the definition of “Indian” for 
federal criminal jurisdiction. The Court explicitly disclaimed any conclusion on whether a 
white man could nonetheless consent to tribal jurisdiction, stating that “he may by such 
adoption become entitled to certain privileges in the tribe, and make himself amenable 
to their laws and usages.”50 While as a practical matter, extension of federal jurisdiction 
over crimes committed by naturalized tribal citizens might have divested a tribal nation’s 
prosecutorial authority, as the person might have been in federal custody before the 
tribe could assert its jurisdiction, Rogers did not divest such jurisdiction as a matter of 
law.51 
 
Importantly, for the tribal nations with a treaty-recognized right to exclusive 
criminal jurisdiction over adopted or naturalized citizens, Rogers became a legal nullity. 
The 1866 treaty with the Cherokee Nation authorized federal jurisdiction over crimes 
between two naturalized Cherokee citizens, and therefore effectively overturned 
Rogers. The Choctaw and Chickasaw treaty’s recognition of authority was even                                                         
47 Treaty with the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, supra, note 41, Art. 38.  
48 Treaty with the Seminoles, supra, note 37, Art. 2.  
49 Treaty with the Creeks, supra, note 38, Art. 2.  
50 See Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573.  
51 Indeed, Rogers himself was put into federal custody by Cherokee law enforcement, as there were no 
Cherokee jails to keep him, on the expectation he would then be returned for prosecution by the 
Cherokee Nation. See Berger, supra, note 1, at 1984. Instead, federal officials kept him, transferred him 
to Little Rock, Arkansas, and initiated federal prosecution. Id. at 1985-88. In a curious twist, Rogers 
himself died while escaping from federal custody before his case even reached the Supreme Court. See 
Id. at 1999. The Court was then answering a theoretical question that would have had no practical effect 
on Rogers himself. See Id. at 1999-2003.  
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broader, as it reserved criminal jurisdiction to those nations seemingly regardless of the 
status of the victim.  
 
Federal courts grappled with these treaty exceptions to Rogers, but ultimately 
upheld the tribes’ exclusive criminal jurisdiction. For example, “Hanging judge” Parker of 
the Circuit Court of Western Arkansas found ways around the treaty requirements in 
several cases.52 In Ex Parte Kenyon (1878), ironically the main case cited by the U.S. 
Supreme Court to bolster its decision in Oliphant,53 Judge Parker ruled the Cherokee 
Nation lacked jurisdiction over a white man who had been naturalized through 
marriage.54 Kenyon, the white man, had stolen a horse, the horse of his deceased 
Cherokee wife in fact, and had been sentenced by the Nation to five years detention.55 
Parker granted a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the Nation generally lacked 
jurisdiction over a non-Indian.56 Though Judge Parker acknowledged Kenyon was a 
citizen of the Nation under its exclusive jurisdiction granted by the treaty, Judge Parker 
reasoned that Kenyon’s Cherokee citizenship lapsed under Cherokee law when he left 
the Nation with the horse and his children.57 In another case, Judge Parker evaded the 
Choctaw treaty by questioning the status of Choctaw wives in Ex Parte Reynolds 
(1879). This case concerned a murder of one white citizen by another.58 Judge Parker 
focused on paternal descent to find one of the wives was not truly Choctaw. Therefore, 
the case was not within the exclusive Choctaw jurisdiction under the treaty, because 
this finding meant one of the white men in the controversy was not actually a Choctaw 
citizen.59  
 
Though Judge Parker’s decisions found ways around exclusive tribal jurisdiction, 
the United States Supreme Court later affirmed the tribes’ exclusive authority over such 
cases in several opinions. In Nofire v. United States (1897), the United States attempted 
to prosecute several Cherokees for the murder of a naturalized white Cherokee 
citizen.60 The circuit court had concluded that the evidence of the victim’s compliance 
with the requirements of Cherokee marriage laws, and therefore evidence of his 
citizenship, was insufficient.61 The Supreme Court disagreed, and held that the victim 
had married a Cherokee woman in a manner consistent with the Cherokees’ 
requirements for white intermarriage discussed above, and by doing so the victim was                                                         
52 The moniker “hanging judge” was quite appropriate, as between 1875 and 1896 his court hanged 
seventy-nine people, including many Indians. Berger, supra, note 1, at 1998. Justice Rehnquist’s opinion 
in Oliphant includes a lengthy digression in a footnote discussing Judge Parker and his knowledge of 
Indians in a notably positive light. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 200 n. 10.  
53 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 199-200.  
54 14 F. Cas. 353, 355 (1878) (No. 7,720).  
55 Id. at 353. 
56 Id. at 355. 
57 Id. 
58 20 F. Cas. 582, 582-83 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1879) (No. 11,719). 
59 Id. at 585. For a discussion of that case and its influence over the conception of Indian status in the late 
nineteenth century, see Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian law to 1935, 
51 S.D. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2006).  
60 See 164 U.S. 657, 658 (1897). 
61 Id. 
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“to a certain extent allying himself with the Cherokee Nation.”62 The Court similarly held 
in Ex Parte Mayfield (1891) that a Cherokee citizen, whether a citizen by birth or 
adoption, could not be convicted of adultery in federal court because of the Cherokees’ 
exclusive jurisdiction.63 The Supreme Court suggested crimes between Freedmen were 
also within the Cherokee Nation’s exclusive jurisdiction in Alberty v. United States 
(1896).64 The Court ultimately upheld federal jurisdiction over the Freedman defendant 
because the victim was the illegitimate son of a Choctaw man and a black slave, and 
according to the Court not an “Indian,” and the victim’s marriage to an adopted black 
woman did not grant him citizenship under Cherokee law.65 Further, in Lucas v. United 
States, the Court, following Alberty, concluded that the murder of a black Freedman in 
the Choctaw Nation by a Choctaw Indian would be under exclusive tribal jurisdiction.66 
According to the Court, the prosecution implied to the trial court that “there were 
negroes who were, and those who were not, Indians, in a jurisdictional sense.”67 The 
Court reversed the trial court on the issue of how the black victim’s citizenship in the 
Choctaw Nation was to be proven, rejecting the lower court’s presumption that a “negro” 
in the Nation was not a tribal citizen. 68  
 
  Not only did the federal courts weigh in on tribal citizenship, but federal officials 
also recognized adopted or naturalized white men as “Indians” when they abided by 
requirements of tribal approval of land cessions. Indeed, in the late nineteenth century, 
during the dismantling of tribal lands through allotment, negotiators for the United States 
openly sought out and recorded the signatures of intermarried men as fully empowered 
to act along with other tribal citizens in certain situations. For example, the agreement 
with the Sioux Nation to break up the Great Sioux Reservation in 1889 was signed by 
some ninety-four white men, who were described as “white man” or “squaw man”69 
openly in the federal commissioners’ report to Congress.70 They were nonetheless 
listed as adult male members of the Nation empowered to approve the agreement.71 
Justification for such treatment appears to have been based on a reference in the 1868 
Treaty of Fort Laramie to persons “legally incorporated,” with the tribe, a provision which 
also appears in several treaties negotiated with the Navajo Nation and other tribes in 
the same year.72 The United States Supreme Court observed in Red Bird v. United                                                         
62 Id. at 662.  
63 See 141 U.S. 107, 114 (1891). 
64 162 U.S. 499, 501-02.  
65 See Id. at 501, 504-05.  
66 163 U.S. 612, 614-15 (1896). 
67 Id. at 615. 
68 See Id. at 616.  
69 “Squaw man” was a term used in the nineteenth century to describe a non-Indian married to an Indian 
woman. www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/squaw man (accessed April 5, 2012). While used 
pejoratively in some circumstances, it was also used sometimes, as here, as a neutral description. See 
Spruhan, supra, note 58, at 21.  
70 See, e.g., Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 51, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 253, 259, 275-77, 279, 289-92. 
71 See Id.  
72 See Id. at 253 (identifying signatory as “White; incorporated into tribe in 1868”), 275-77, 279 (identifying 
several signatories as “squaw man since 1868”); Treaty with the Sioux, April 29, 1868, Art. 6. See also 
Treaty with the Navajo, June 1, 1868, Art. 5; Treaty with the Crow, May 7, 1868, Art. 6. Historian Harry  
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States, a case challenging the right of certain white men to Cherokee allotments, that 
the agreement to allot the Cherokee Nation would not have been approved without the 
participation of white naturalized citizens.73 Also, an agreement with the Wichita 
included the signature of at least one intermarried white man, W.C. West, as an Indian 
empowered to sign, and authorized allotments to citizens of the tribe “native and 
adopted.”74  
 
 Congress also recognized naturalized or adopted citizens of the Civilized Tribes 
as subject to the jurisdiction of their respective tribal nation, and as eligible for tribal 
property. Though Congress generally barred white men who married Indian women 
after August 9, 1888 from claiming an interest in tribal property, it nonetheless 
exempted such men who were “otherwise a member of any tribe of Indians.”75 In an 
1890 act to organize the territory of Oklahoma, Congress recognized that “the judicial 
tribunals of the Indian nations shall retain exclusive jurisdiction in all civil and criminal 
cases arising in the country in which members of the Nation, by nativity or adoption, 
shall be the only parties.”76 Under the instructions of the Dawes Commission, a quasi-
judicial tribunal created by Congress, whites and Freedmen who established their right 
to citizenship to the satisfaction of the Commission were allotted land from the collective 
property of their adopted tribe.77 Further, when Congress decided to release whites and 
Freedmen from restrictions on their allotments earlier than other tribal citizens, it used 
the curious phrase “Indians who are not of Indian blood” to describe such citizens in the 
title of the legislation.78 However, Congress did preclude other non-Indians from 
claiming allotments through judicial action, by granting a cause of action against the 
United States to establish eligibility only to “persons who are in whole or in part of Indian 
blood.”79 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Anderson has referred to white men recognized under the Treaty of Fort Laramie as “68-ers.” SOUTH 
DAKOTA HISTORY: THE WALDRON-BLACK TOMAHAWK CONTROVERSY AND THE STATE OF MIXED-BLOODS AMONG 
THE TETON SIOUX 30, 34 (2007).  
73 See 203 U.S. 76, 93 (1906). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that white men married to 
Cherokees after 1875 were ineligible for allotments based on Cherokee law. Id. at 79, 95 (affirming ruling 
of Court of Claims).  
74 See Senate Ex. Doc. 14, 52nd Cong., 2nd Sess., at 12, 14-15 (1892). For a further discussion of W.C. 
West and his unsuccessful suit against the secretary of the interior to compel the grant of an allotment, 
see infra, text accompanying notes 80-92929279-91.  
75 25 U.S.C. § 181. Curiously, this provision is still in the current United States Code.  
76 Act of May 2, 1890, § 30, 26 Stat. 81 (emphasis added). This provision supported the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decisions that the tribal nations had exclusive jurisdiction over crimes between tribal citizens, 
whether Indians by blood, naturalized or adopted. See, e.g., Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 502 
(1896) (discussing statute).  
77 See H.R. Rep. 60-1454, at 2-4 (1908) (listing numbers of Indians by blood, intermarried whites, and 
freedmen granted allotments among the Five Civilized Tribes). The U.S. Supreme Court did deny some 
white claimants allotments in the Cherokee Nation by upholding restrictions on their citizenship under 
Cherokee law. See Red Bird, 203 U.S. at 95.  
78 See Act of April 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 189, 204.  
79 See 25 U.S.C. § 345. See also Drapeau v. United States, 195 F. 130, 136 (C.C.D.S.D. 1912) (holding 
no jurisdiction over suit by white man claiming allotment as tribal citizen of Sioux Nation).  
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 Though Congress recognized non-Indian citizenship in certain situations, the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in United States ex rel. West v. Hitchcock, which arose out of 
the 1891 agreement with the Wichita discussed above, suggests that the federal 
government can intrude on tribal decisions to adopt or naturalize non-Indians as tribal 
citizens.80 The Department of the Interior denied W.C. West, an intermarried white man 
and signatory to the agreement, an allotment, despite his claim that Wichita leaders 
adopted him as a tribal citizen.81 West filed a writ of mandamus against Secretary of the 
Interior Ethan Hitchcock, alleging that his adoption by the Wichita council required the 
secretary to issue him an allotment.82 Secretary Hitchcock responded by arguing, 
among other things, that he had the sole “power and authority to place an effective veto 
upon [West’s] adoption by the Wichita Indian Tribe.”83 Interestingly, the record in the 
case included correspondence showing that the Office of Indian Affairs had rejected 
such adoptions in other situations under a general departmental policy to disapprove 
such adoptions except for “exceptionally good reasons,”84 including a request of the 
Comanche Nation to adopt Mexican captives.85 In his brief, West pointed out the ironic 
position Interior was taking given his approved signature as an Indian on the agreement 
ceding tribal lands to the United States86: 
 
[s]o long as his services in negotiating the agreement were necessary and 
his influence with the other Indians was desirable, his title to tribal 
membership was clear enough and strong enough to satisfy the most 
jealous guardian of tribal rights to be found in the Indian Office. Only when 
the need for him was past and when he demanded his part of the 
consideration for the grant of these lands was it discovered by the Interior 
Department that it was the function of the Secretary and not of the tribe in 
council to determine who was and who was not of its membership.87 
 
 Unmoved, the Supreme Court sided with the Department of the Interior. The 
Court, through an opinion authored by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, held that 
mandamus was inappropriate because the secretary indeed had the discretionary right 
to accept or deny whites as tribal citizens, regardless of the actions of tribal leaders 
under tribal law.88 The Court did not clearly identify the source of this right, but cited 
“long-established” Department of the Interior practice and a broad statutory provision                                                         
80 205 U.S. 80 (1907). 
81 Id. at 83.  
82 Id. at 82-83.  
83 United States ex Rel. West v. Hitchcock, No. 194, Records and Briefs of the United States Supreme 
Court, Brief on Behalf of Defendant in Error 32. 
84 Letter of Secretary of Interior C.L. Bliss to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, February 7, 1898, reprinted 
in Transcript of Record, supra, note 28, at 39. 
85 See Letter of Acting Commissioner A.C. Tonner to Mr. Davidson and Riddle, September 30, 1901, 
reprinted in Transcript of Record, supra, note 28, at 46.   
86 See supra, text accompanying note 74.  
87 United States ex rel. West v. Hitchcock, No. 194, supra, note 84, Brief for Plaintiff in Error 17 (emphasis 
added).  
88 Hitchcock, 205 U.S. at 84. 
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generally empowering the secretary in Indian affairs.89 However the Court also stated 
later in the opinion that “someone must decide who the members are.”90 The Court did 
state, in response to West’s argument that the tribal nation should decide, that 
secretarial approval was indeed a good thing for the “rather helpless” Indians, as “the 
temptation to white men to go through an Indian marriage for the purpose of getting 
Indian rights is sufficiently plain.”91 Though decided in the context of the right to tribal 
property, the case suggests that the Department of the Interior generally has the 
authority to deny tribal adoptions and decline to recognize non-Indians’ consent through 
tribal citizenship.  
 
 The Bureau of Indian Affairs later asserted the same power to deny tribal 
adoption or naturalization through its power to approve tribal constitutions under the 
Indian Reorganization Act. In a general letter to BIA employees and tribal leaders in 
1934, John Collier, then Commissioner of Indian Affairs, at least entertained the 
possibility that a non-Indian married into a tribe might be accepted as a tribal citizen.92 
However, in Circular 3123, issued in 1935, Collier stated that the Bureau should only 
approve adoption provisions in proposed constitutions if  
 
[t]he provisions for the adoption of non-members . . . require approval by 
the Secretary of the Interior for each applicant, unless such individual 
must be a person of Indian descent related by marriage or descent to the 
members of the tribe.93 
 
Collier therefore sought to continue the Department of the Interior’s oversight of non-
Indian adoptions asserted and upheld in West by requiring each one to be approved by 
the Secretary of the Interior. The Indian Reorganization Act itself defined “Indian” as, 
along with those of one-half Indian blood and descendants of Indians living on 
reservations, “all persons who are of Indian descent who are members of any 
recognized Indian tribe now under federal jurisdiction.”94 Non-Indian tribal citizens, if any 
still existed at the time, therefore were excluded from the act under the three categories 
in the definition.  
 
 IRA-era tribal constitutions generally followed this formulation of tribal citizenship. 
Many contain general provisions acknowledging the possibility of adoption, and some                                                         
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 85, 86.  
91 Id. at 85.  
92 See Letter of John Collier to Superintendents, Tribal Councils and Individual Indians, January 20, 1934, 
at 6 (posing the question whether “all the residents of the reservation who are of Indian descent, or 
married to an Indian, be admitted to citizenship or membership in the proposed community, or shall 
restrictions, depending on degree of blood or length of residence on the reservation, be provided?” 
(emphasis added)).  
93 Circular 3123, Office of Indian Affairs (November 18, 1935), reprinted as Exhibit 1, Index 36, 2 
Appendices to the Final Report, Task Force No. 9, Law Consolidation, Revision, and Codification, 
American Indian Policy Review Commission (1977).  
94 Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, § 19.  
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contain a requirement for secretarial approval of such adoptions.95 However, whether at 
the choice of the tribal nation, or at the insistence of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, explicit 
naturalization or recognition of non-Indian tribal citizens essentially disappeared.  
 
 One anecdotal example of discussions between a tribal nation and the federal 
government on the issue involved two Pima-Maricopa tribal communities in Arizona. 
According to Felix Cohen, then an attorney working with Collier, the Pima-Maricopa 
communities at Gila River and Salt River had proposed a joint constitution that would 
have recognized “Caucasians” previously married into the community as members.96 
According to Cohen, the same constitution would have barred future “[m]ixed marriages 
of any kind” on pain of a forfeit of membership by the member engaging in the 
marriage.97 Cohen used this proposal in a memorandum on the drafting of tribal 
constitutions as an example of a constitution that “considers the complications arising 
out of intermarriage.”98 However, the final constitutions, approved by the Office of Indian 
Affairs in 1936, contained no such recognition of non-Indian spouses, but neither did 
they bar future mixed marriages.99 Instead, they simply barred adoptions completely.100  
 
CURRENT STATUS OF NON-INDIAN CONSENT 
 
 Fast forward to 2012. You would be hard pressed to find examples of consent 
through citizenship, adoption, or otherwise. The long history of non-Indian adoption and 
naturalization is mostly forgotten, with the exception of ongoing controversies within the 
five Oklahoma tribes concerning the status of Freedmen descendants.101 As discussed 
by Kirsty Gover, tribal constitutions since 1934 have increasingly applied explicit blood 
quantum or lineal descent from persons of Indian blood as requirements to define tribal 
citizenship.102 Even the tribal nations that previously naturalized or adopted intermarried 
whites and/or Freedmen, except for the Seminoles, have amended their citizenship laws 
through various methods to restrict citizenship to those able to document their descent 
from persons with Indian blood.103 Why such changes were made is controversial, and                                                         
95 See KIRSTY GOVER, TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 133 (2010). In her empirical study of tribal constitutions, 
Gover states that 92 per cent of constitutions ratified before 1941 contain an express reference to tribal 
adoptions. Id. According to Gover, the proportion of constitutions referencing adoptions has since 
dropped to 74 per cent, explained as resulting from the omission of adoption provisions in new 
constitutions, and not because of amendments to older ones. Id. 
96 See FELIX S. COHEN, ON THE DRAFTING OF TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS 15 (D. Wilkins, ed. 2006).  
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 14.  
99 Constitution of the Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, Art. II (May 14, 1936); Constitution of 
the Salt River Indian Community, Art. II (June 11, 1940). 
100 Id.  
101 See infra, notes 103, 104, 105.  
102 See Gover, supra, note 96, at 132. 
103 The Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Creek constitutions restrict membership to descendants of individuals 
identified on Indian by blood rolls constructed by the Dawes Commission. See Constitution of the 
Chickasaw Nation, August 27, 1983, Art. 2, § 1; Constitution of the Choctaw Nation, July 9, 1983, Art. 2, § 
1; Constitution of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, June 24, 1995, Art. 3, § 2.  
The Cherokee Nation amended its constitution in 2007 by referendum approved by the Cherokee 
people to require Cherokee, Delaware, or Shawnee Indian blood, thereby intentionally excluding  
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beyond the scope of this article.104 Importantly, the BIA continues to suggest to tribes 
that adoption or naturalization should generally not occur, as, according to the Bureau 
“inclusion of non-Indians as members” is one of several provisions that “render 
proposed constitutions inappropriate.”105 Gover suggests that such attitude is consistent 
with the Bureau’s general view that blood quantum requirements ensure the political 
cohesion of a tribal nation.106 Whatever the reason, there are very few tribes that 
explicitly authorize adoption or naturalization of non-Indians as tribal citizens.107 
 
 Some tribes do assert consent through other theories than adoption or 
naturalization. Indeed, as shown by the Hjert case discussed above, at least the Port 
Gamble S’Klallam tribe has recently attempted to prosecute a non-Indian through 
written consent.108 There may be other tribes that similarly accept consent in individual 
or general situations, including as a condition of living or working on tribal lands. Absent 
known affirmative statutory law on the practice, is hard to gauge how common such 
consent really is within tribal nations.                                                                                                                                                                                    
Cherokee Freedmen and intermarried whites. See Cherokee Registrar v. Nash, No. SC-2011-02, slip op. 
at 4-5 (Cherokee Sup. Ct. August 22, 2011). The Cherokee Supreme Court recently upheld the 
referendum by concluding it lacked the jurisdiction to review it. See Id. at 7. Interestingly, as part of its 
ruling, the Cherokee Supreme Court stated that the Treaty of 1866 never granted citizenship to the 
Freedmen, but only “that the Freedmen would be treated as equals to the citizens of the Cherokee Nation 
under the federal law as it existed at the time.” Id. at 8.  
The Seminole constitution defines citizenship eligibility as “all Seminole citizens whose names 
appear on the final rolls of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma [from 1906] and their descendants,” and 
therefore does not exclude Freedmen. Constitution of the Seminoles, March 8, 1969, as amended, Art. 2. 
Further, the Seminole membership code indicates that “each Seminole Freedman enrolled member” is 
entitled to membership in a Freedman Band of the Nation. Seminole Code, Title 22, § 102(d). However, 
the Seminole Nation has barred Freedmen from certain tribal programs through requirements for a 
certificate of Indian blood or descendancy from a member of the Seminole Nation as it existed in Florida 
in 1828, fueling litigation and controversy. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 343 F.3d 1282, 1285-88 (10th 
Cir. 2003) (describing dispute). The Seminole Nation did attempt to change its membership criteria 
through constitutional amendment to eliminate Freedmen citizenship, but the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
disapproved the amendment. See Seminole Nation v. Norton, 2001 WL 36228153 at * 17(D.D.C. 2001) 
(affirming BIA disapproval of Freedmen amendments).  
104 For further discussion of these controversial citizenship issues within the Cherokee and other 
Oklahoma tribal nations, see, e.g., CIRCE STURM, BLOOD POLITICS: RACE, CULTURE AND IDENTITY IN THE 
CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA 168-200 (2002) (discussing Cherokee Freedmen), KEVIN NOBLE 
MAILLARD, REDWASHING HISTORY: TRIBAL ANACHRONISMS IN THE SEMINOLE NATION CASES, IN THE INDIAN 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY 87 (2012) (discussing Freedmen controversy in Seminole Nation).  
105 United States Department of the Interior, Developing and Reviewing Tribal Constitutions and 
Amendments: A Handbook 6-7 (1987), quoted in Gover, supra, note 96, at 119.  
106 Gover, supra, note 96, at 127-28.  
107 The Seminole Nation of Oklahoma’s constitution allows enrollment of Freedmen descendants and 
assignment to a Freedman Band of the Nation. See supra, note 103. However, such Freedmen may 
indeed have Indian ancestry, though the Dawes Commission may not have documented it when it went 
about classifying Indians by blood and Freedmen for the Seminole rolls. See Maillard, supra, note 105, at 
97-98; Ariela Gross, What Blood Won’t Tell 155-160 (2008) (discussing subjective decisions of Dawes 
Commission in classifying individuals as Indians by blood or Freedmen for preparation of Dawes Rolls). 
Interestingly, Congress authorized only one Seminole roll, but the Dawes Commission itself separated out 
the rolls between Seminoles by blood and Freedmen. Gross, supra, at 153.  
108 See text accompanying notes 7-13.  
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 The Navajo Nation has affirmatively asserted a theory of consent for a certain 
class of non-Indians. The Navajo Nation Council amended its criminal code in 2000 to 
assert full criminal jurisdiction over all persons married to Navajos, called hadane in the 
Navajo language.109 At the same time, the Nation purported to be able to “civilly 
prosecute” other non-Indians.110 Apparently based on the Navajo Supreme Court 
opinion Means v. District Court of the Chinle Judicial District,111 the Council in 2000 
stated that  
 
[n]othing in this Section shall be deemed to preclude exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction over one by reason of assuming tribal relations with the Navajo 
people or being an “in law” or hadane or relative as defined by Navajo 
Common law, custom or tradition, submits himself or herself to the 
criminal jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.112  
 
In Means, the Court applied Navajo common law to conclude that such “in-laws” 
consent to Navajo jurisdiction through the reciprocal obligations they owe the clan of 
their Navajo spouse.113 Interestingly, the Court justified such theory of consent through 
citations to Nofire and the other U.S. Supreme Court opinions discussed above, even 
though those opinions affirmed non-Indian consent recognized by the United States 
through treaty and statute.114 Though Means concerned a non-member Indian, the 
Council extended the theory of consent to non-Indian spouses. Importantly, the Navajo 
Nation Code prohibits adoption of non-Navajos, and does not otherwise recognize the 
naturalization of non-Indian hadane as citizens of the Nation.115 The Nation applies a 
one-quarter blood quantum requirement to be recognized as a Navajo citizen.116 The 
only explicit benefit for in-laws under the Navajo Code is that they receive second-tier 
employment preference below enrolled Navajos, but above other Indians not married to 
Navajos, under the Navajo Preference in Employment Act.117  
 
 However, though the Navajo Criminal Code purports to extend the Nation’s 
criminal jurisdiction to non-Indians, in reality the Navajo Division of Public Safety, the                                                         
109 See 17 N.N.C. § 204(C) (2005).  
110 17 N.N.C. § 204(A) (2005).  
111 7 Nav. R. 382 (1999).  
112 17 N.N.C. § 204(C) (2005).  
113 Means, 7 Nav. R 392-93. For a detailed discussion of the Means case, which concerned American 
Indian Movement activist Russell Means and his challenge to Navajo criminal jurisdiction, see Paul 
Spruhan, Case Note: Means v. District Court of the Chinle Judicial District and the Hadane Doctrine in 
Navajo Criminal Law, 1 TRIBAL L. J. 3 (2000-2001).  
114 Means, 7 Nav. R. at 391-92.  
115 See 1 N.N.C. § 702(A) (2005). Interestingly, this provision was intended to prevent non-Indian actors 
from claiming to have been adopted or made honorary members of the Nation while filming movies in the 
area during the 1930s. See Paul Spruhan, The Origins, Current Status, and Future Prospects of Blood 
Quantum as the Definition of Citizenship in the Navajo Nation, 8 TRIBAL L. J. 1, 4 (2008).  
116 1 N.N.C. § 701(C) (2005). For a discussion of this provision and its origins, see Spruhan, supra, note 
115, at 3-10.  
117 See 15 N.N.C. § 614(A) (2005). 
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Office of the Prosecutor, and the Navajo Nation courts have not invoked such authority 
in an actual situation at the time of the writing of this article. Part of the reason for this is 
that the Nation’s police officers are cross-commissioned or otherwise authorized to 
enforce Arizona and New Mexico state law.118 They therefore can arrest non-Indians 
without having to invoke Navajo law and can transfer them to state authorities if 
consistent with the Nation’s extradition laws.119 Further, many of the Nation’s officers 
and criminal investigators have Special Law Enforcement Commissions from the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs.120 Such commissions allow the Nation’s officer and criminal 
investigators to make federal arrests, including of non-Indians, and transfer such 
offenders to federal custody for crimes under federal jurisdiction.121 Therefore, as a 
practical matter, the Nation’s law enforcement need not invoke Navajo law to arrest and 
seek prosecution of non-Indians, though Navajo law allows it. Whether declination of 
prosecution by the state or federal governments will trigger the desire to test its stated 
authority over non-Indian hadane remains to be seen.  
 
A REVIEW OF POSSIBLE THEORIES OF CONSENT 
 
 What ways might tribal nations think about asserting jurisdiction through 
consent? There are three examples discussed above: (1) recognizing citizenship in the 
nation through formal or informal adoption or naturalization, (2) imputing consent under 
tribal law by marrying a tribal citizen or otherwise becoming part of an Indian family or 
tribal society, and (3) accepting an invocation of consent in writing. Each of these three 
examples involves either complex questions of tribal law and policy. 
 
 All involve complex questions of tribal law and policy. Granting citizenship to non-
Indians is the most controversial. Tribal citizenship for a given tribal nation may be so 
inherently a matter of family, clan, or “blood” that a tribe will not admit anyone not 
biologically descended from a tribal member or at least from a person with Indian 
ancestry. A tribe’s traditional law may preclude it, or the prevailing policy views of the 
tribe and its citizens may be against granting citizenship to non-Indians. However, tribal 
nations might seriously consider it, if not inconsistent with its own views of its identity 
and such identity’s relationship to political citizenship in the tribe.122                                                          
118 See, e.g., A.R.S. 13-3874(A) (empowering tribal police to enforce Arizona laws if APOST certified); 
Cross-Commission Agreement between the Navajo Nation and the McKinley County Sheriff’s Office 
(December 8, 2007) (authorizing Navajo police to act as county sheriffs in McKinley County, New 
Mexico).  
119 See 17 N.N.C. §§ 1951, et seq. (2005) (setting out requirements for extradition of Indians by state 
authorities). While restricted in the statute to Indians, it may be that a Navajo Nation court would require 
an extradition request from a state government even for a non-Indian in Navajo custody, particularly one 
married to a Navajo.  
120 See 25 U.S.C. 2804(a) (authorizing tribal and other non-federal law enforcement to be commissioned 
as federal officers by the Bureau of Indian Affairs); 12 C.F.R. § 12.21(a) (discussing SLECs).  
121 See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (authorizing federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes by non-Indians against 
Indians).  
122 For discussions supporting consideration of such a proposal, see Matthew Fletcher, Race and Indian 
Tribal Nationhood, 11 WYO. L. REV. 295, 324 (2011); John Snowden, et al., American Indian Sovereignty 
and Naturalization: It’s a Race Thing, 80 NEBR. L. REV. 171, 237-38 (2001).  
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 It would appear that granting full citizenship, with the right to vote and otherwise 
politically and socially participate in tribal government, has the best chance of justifying 
tribal criminal jurisdiction through consent under federal law. Indeed, the reasoning of 
the recent United States Supreme Court opinions limiting tribal criminal jurisdiction, 
particularly in Duro v. Reina, suggests as much. In Duro, Justice Kennedy tied the 
inherent authority of tribal nations to Anglo-American theories of consent by the 
governed.123 Kennedy concluded that a tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction even over 
citizens of other tribes, so-called “non-member Indians,” because they were not citizens 
of the prosecuting tribe and therefore can never “consent” to tribal government.124 
Kennedy rejected the argument that a defendant’s contacts with the tribe or a tribal 
member justified the tribe’s assertion of jurisdiction, stating that such an argument was 
just another attempt at establishing jurisdiction through mere physical presence on tribal 
lands.125 Importantly, Kennedy explicitly reserved the question whether a nonmember 
could consent to tribal jurisdiction through some other method.126  
 
 In Justice Kennedy’s formulation, the definition of tribal citizenship through 
familial or biological ties is the key stumbling block for tribal jurisdiction. The use of tribal 
or Indian blood quantum by definition bars naturalization of anyone not already in 
possession of the necessary ancestry. Fixing that is as easy as changing the citizenship 
criteria of the tribal nation. It is important, however, to add the caveat that the 
Department of the Interior might assert itself directly through disapproval of any 
necessary tribal constitutional changes to citizenship rules or by generally opining that 
such change is impermissible.127 Whether something as seemingly radical, at least from 
a modern perception of Indian identity, as citizenship for non-Indians is a plausible 
political and social possibility in any tribal nation is another question.128  
 
 The Navajo Nation approach has the attractive quality of being based on tribal 
traditional law, but has the weakness of imputing consent by conduct. The Nation does 
not seek any affirmative acceptance of the responsibility of an in-law to Navajo law, but 
simply states that marriage to a Navajo subjects the non-Indian spouse to its 
jurisdiction. Marriage to a Navajo is indeed more than simple conduct, as it creates a 
legal relationship between the spouses. However, the Nation’s assertion of jurisdiction 
does not depend on creating a legal relationship under the laws of the Navajo Nation or 
on explicit consent to Navajo law as part of the marriage ceremony, as apparently 
anyone married to a Navajo under any state or tribal law subjects himself or herself to                                                         
123 See Duro, 495 U.S. at 693-94.  
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 695.  
126 Id. at 698 (“We have no occasion in this case to address the effect of a formal acquiescence to tribal 
jurisdiction that might be made, for example, in return for a tribe's agreement not to exercise its power to 
exclude an offender from tribal lands[.]”) 
127 See supra, text accompanying notes 93-94, 106, 105.  
128 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra, note 123, at 324-25 (discussing “zealous” defense of citizenship criteria by 
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians as example of potential resistance by tribes to 
expanding citizenship rules).  
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Navajo jurisdiction through the marriage itself. With no corollary right to vote or directly 
participate in the government of the Nation, such theory does not appear to alleviate the 
concerns expressed by Justice Kennedy.129 Whether the Nation or any other tribe 
should be concerned about conforming their views on jurisdiction to external 
expectations, particularly when supported by and consistent with tribal traditional law, is 
another question.  
 
 The Port Gamble S’Klallam approach, if authorized by the tribal nation’s own law, 
and if done carefully, has its strengths. Here, there is no imputation of consent; consent 
is clearly given. The use of a form clearly stating the non-Indian’s right to consent or not, 
and an explanation of the conditions under which the tribe will accept the consent, goes 
a long way in bolstering the perception that tribal nations adhere to notions of fairness 
familiar to outside federal courts. It may be that the Port Gamble S’Klallam Court of 
Appeals’ emphasis on a clear and intelligently given consent reflects the tribal justices’ 
expectations that non-Indians be given full due process rights as a matter of tribal 
concepts of fairness and justice. Regardless, such emphasis clearly assuages their 
stated concerns over compliance with the federal Indian Civil Rights Act and federal 
notions of due process and equal protection.130 Such requirements may then fulfill tribal 
law and, whether consciously or not, conform to federal requirements as well.  
 
 That approach appears stronger than generally purporting to subject a non-
Indian to criminal jurisdiction as a condition of residence on tribal lands or employment 
by the tribe or one of its members.131 However, the explicit conditioning of residency on 
tribal lands or employment by a tribe or its enterprises at least involves some benefit in 
exchange for the consent, unlike the bare consent in Hjert,132 though not the right to 
political participation contemplated in Duro.133 Indeed, as a tribe has the power to 
exclude non-members from tribal lands,134 why can’t a tribe condition the privilege of 
living on such lands through consent to all tribal laws? Indeed, even under stringent 
United States Supreme Court case law such consent at the very least can establish 
some civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.135 However, the Court also has stated that the 
assertion of tribal civil jurisdiction must have a nexus to the non-Indian’s consent, and 
consent in one area does not result in general consent to all tribal jurisdiction.136 If such 
blanket consent is questionable in the civil context, it is even less likely allowable in the 
criminal context. However, as a practical matter, if the non-Indian breaches the 
agreement by filing a federal petition for habeas corpus to preclude prosecution, the                                                         
129 For a further discussion of this problem of imputed consent under the hadane theory, see Spruhan, 
supra, note 114.  
130 See Hjert. No. POR-CR-09/209-169, slip op. at 16.  
131See Id. Applying an immigration analogy, Professor Fletcher supports a requirement that non-members 
consent to full tribal jurisdiction as a condition of living in tribal housing or on tribal lands. See Fletcher, 
supra, note 122, at 326.  
132 No. POR-CR-09/209-169. 
133 495 U.S. 676. 
134 See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144-45 (1982). 
135 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). 
136 Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 656 (2001).  
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tribe can simply exclude him or her or terminate their employment, assuming such 
action is otherwise consistent with tribal law. For non-Indians with tribal member 
spouses and children, such consequences can be a compelling incentive for 
compliance. However, it is unclear whether any tribe actually enforces such consent,137 




 In the end, the great divide between tribes and the United States Supreme Court 
reflects quite different theories of consent. For the tribes discussed in this article, 
consent by non-Indians is almost exclusively based on conduct less than full political 
participation and citizenship. From mere physical presence to marriage to case-specific 
consent, tribes have conceptualized consent under their own laws and policies, and 
have not extended full political rights to non-Indians as a condition of the assumption of 
criminal authority. Whether tribes adjust their views to comply with the Court’s vision of 
consent by the governed, seemingly requiring full political participation, or transcend 
that vision to conform to their own unique views of government authority, is within the 
right of each tribe to decide. However, the consequences of those choices on tribal 
societies must be fully acknowledged and understood, as any attempt to assert criminal 
jurisdiction ultimately can subject the tribe to federal court review.  
 
 Regardless of the relative merits of these different theories of consent, there is a 
simpler way for a tribe to exercise its full sovereignty: a non-Indian can simply consent 
by not objecting to such jurisdiction. Barring sua sponte action by the tribal court, as 
happened in Hjert,138 the non-Indian defendant has all the power to consent he or she 
needs. He or she can simply decline to seek dismissal of the case on jurisdictional 
grounds or seek habeas review in federal court. Indeed, if non-Indians living and 
working within tribal nations truly believe the rhetoric of tribal sovereignty, they should 
practice it through consent. It may be difficult for anyone subjected involuntarily to a 
criminal justice system to forego an argument that could bar prosecution. However, for 
non-Indians caught up in day-to-day incidents within Indian Country, it is time to 
consider something larger: the continued vitality of tribal governments through the 
practical application of tribal sovereignty. For non-Indians married into the tribe, or who 
are employed by the tribal government or one of its members, or have permission to 
reside on tribal lands, compliance is a natural outgrowth of the privileges received. This 
also means, however, that a tribal government may have to adjust its views on who their 
constituents are, and to whom tribal services are provided.  
                                                         
137 The Pueblo of Isleta recently began requiring non-members, apparently not just non-Indians, to pass a 
background check before being allowed to reside within the Pueblo. See Ungelbah Daniel-Davila, Non-
Tribal Residents of Isleta Pueblo Must Undergo Background Checks, Albuquerque Journal, February 29, 
2012, http://www.abqjournal.com/main/2012/02/29/abqnewsseeker/non-tribal-residents-of-isleta-pueblo-
must-undergo-background-checks.html. Though there is no apparent requirement to consent to tribal 
criminal laws, the Pueblo ordinance is one method of conditioning residency on adherence to tribal 
requirements.  
138 No. POR-CR-09/209-169. 
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 Put another way, non-Indian obedience to tribal law is active resistance to the 
ongoing federal reduction of tribal authority. Ultimately, even if the U.S. Supreme Court 
denies a tribal nation’s power to condition citizenship, residence, or employment by 
consent to criminal jurisdiction, a non-Indian still can empower tribal nations through on 
the ground compliance with tribal law. That can never be taken away.  
